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ARTICLES

The Right of Abortion in Surrogate
Motherhood Arrangements
CARMINA Y. D'AVERSA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Infertility' is a disorder that affects couples throughout the United
States.2 It is an increasing problem due to the current prevalence of
sexually transmitted diseases which are causing infertility in females.' In
addition, fewer babies are available for adoption.4 As an alternative to
6
5
remaining childless or waiting years to adopt a healthy baby, couples
* Prosecuting attorney, Department of State, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
B.A., Villanova University; J.D., Temple University School of Law.
1. "Infertility is defined as failure to conceive after 1 year of regular coitus

without contraception." R. BENSON, CURRENT OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGIC DIAGNOsIS, 992 (5th ed. 1986).

at 72.

2. Id.
3. Id. See generally, Seligmann, A Nasty Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985,

4. R. BENSON, supra note 1, at 992.
5. It takes approximately three to seven years to adopt a child in the United
States. Preferences as to race, religion and sex increase the delay in adoption. The
reasons for the low supply of adoptable babies are as follows:
(1) liberalized views toward contraceptive use,
(2) greater availability of legal abortions,
(3) single mothers keeping their babies,
(4) successful counseling of troubled families, and
(5) "fading social stigma associated with illegitimacy."
Bowal, Surrogate Procreation:A Motherhood Issue in Legal Obscurity, 9 QUEEN'S
L.J. 5, 9-10 (1983).
6. This article will not discuss the rights of the single woman and lesbian to
reproduce via the new technologies. See generally Strong & Schinfield, The Single
Woman and Artificial Insemination by Donor, 29 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 293 (1984);
Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263
(1984).
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are turning to reproductive technologies. 7 These include surrogate moth-

erhood, either by artificial insemination or by in vitro fertilization. 9 A
third form of reproductive technology, artificial gestation, 0 does not
require a surrogate mother. There are legal obstacles to both methods
of surrogate motherhood. For example, surrogate arrangements involving
a fee are viewed as baby selling and, therefore, are void as against public
policy." Many commentators have proposed legislation so that surrogate

arrangements can have a secure legal status in society. 2 These commen-

tators, however, have failed to consider the major barrier to wide use
of surrogate mothers, that is, the surrogate mother's right to abort the
child which she is carrying. This article examines the exercise and nonexercise of the right of abortion in the surrogate motherhood and
artificial womb context. It argues that, under Roe v. Wade, 3 the
surrogate has the sole right to decide whether or not to terminate the
pregnancy. No party to a surrogate contract or any person involved in
the arrangement can veto the surrogate's constitutional right. After
considering legislative alternative to vetoing the surrogate's right to abort,
the article concludes that artificial gestation 14 is the legally preferable
7. Generally, this article will address the reproductive technologies that are
used when a wife is unable to conceive or bear a fetus. Female infertility is not the
only reason a couple will hire a surrogate.The wife may not want to bear the child
because it would interrupt her career. Sappideen, The Surrogate Mother-A Growing
Problem, 6 U. NEw S. WALES L.J. 79, 81 (1983).
8. The first known surrogate was Elizabeth Kane (a pseudonym). She delivered
a baby on November 9, 1980. Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial
Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEw ENo. L. REv. 639, 659 (1983).
9. The first successful birth involving surrogate motherhood by in vitro
fertilization took place on April 13, 1986, New York Times, April 17, 1986 at A26,
col. 4.
10. Artificial gestation is still in the experimental stage. P. SINOER & D. WnLLS,
THE REPRODUCTION REVOLUTION 132-133 (1984) [hereinafter P. SINOER].
11. Doe v. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); Annas,
Contracts to Bear a Child: Compassion or Commercialism?, 11 HASTINGS CENT. REP.
23 (1981). But see Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Kentucky 1986) in which the Kentucky
Supreme Court ruled that surrogate parenting procedures do not violate the state's
adoption statute which prohibits the buying and selling of babies. The New York
Surrogate Court, Nassau County, followed the Kentucky ruling in a similar case. See
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
12. One commentator recommended additions and modifications in existing
Oregon legislation to accommodate surrogate motherhood and artificial insemination.
Comment, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of
Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 913, 951-52 (1981).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See P. SINGER, supra note 10.
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form of reproduction technology for the couple when the female partner
is unable to carry the fetus.
In general, surrogate motherhood refers to an arrangement between a married couple and a woman who agrees to be artificially
inseminated 5 or implanted with an embryo, carry the child to term
and surrender the child to the couple at birth.1 6 The typical arrangement involves the surrogate, her husband and the couple who seek
the surrogate's services. Usually a contract is signed, 7 and the surrogate receives a fee.' s The contract provisions typically stipulate that
the surrogate must have already given birth to a child of her own.' 9
She will also be required to undergo psychological and medical testing
15. Usually the surrogate is inseminated with the sperm of the male partner of
the couple who want the child. The surrogate also could be inseminated by a donor
for the couple. This type of insemination is beyond the scope of this article. See
Wallis, The New Origins of Life, Tu4E, September 10, 1984, at 46, 49 (chart presenting
various combinations of ovum and sperm to create embryos). See generally Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465
(1983).
16. As soon after the birth as possible, the surrogate terminates her parental
rights. The child is then adopted by the wife of the couple. If the wife is the genetic
mother, she must rebut the presumption that the gestational female is the natural
mother. Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies, 6 WHrrIR L. REV. 789, 794-97 (1984).

See Smith v. Jones, No. 85 532014 DZ, Slip op. (Wayne County Cir. Ct.,
Mich. March 14, 1986), where the court issued an interim order directing the name
of the ovum donor to be listed as the natural mother on the birth certificate of the
first baby expected to be born as a result of surrogacy by in vitro fertilization. The
court limited its ruling to the circumstances where 1) the parties contracted to engage
in the surrogate process; (2) the parties underwent certain surgical procedures for the
process to take place; (3) in vitro fertilization occurred; and (4) paternity-maternity
tests confirm that "the implanted ovum is, in fact, the child that resulted from the
in vitro fertilization." Id. at 10. The court further ruled that a final declaratory
judgment would be entered after verification of the interim findings of the court by
HLA blood testing of the parties upon birth of the child. The baby was born, and a
final declaratory judgment was wanted on May 30, 1986. See supra note 9; telephone
interview with Noel Keane, Attorney (Dec. 8, 1986).
17. It is advised that the adopting wife of the couple not sign the contract. Not
being a party to the contract, she can say she has not paid for a baby and, therefore,
is not in violation of the adoption statutes. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract
to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 266-267 (1982). But "most courts should reject
this obvious subterfuge on the grounds that the husband (donor) will have paid on
behalf of the wife." Wadlington, supra note 15, at 476.
18. The fee can range from $5,000 to $25,000. L.B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIoNs 203 (1984).
19. This is to insure the couple that the surrogate is capable of bearing a
healthy child. See Brophy, supra note 17, at 265.
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to ensure that she is healthy and will not transmit any genetic defects
to the fetus she will be carrying. 20 Terms of the agreement also
provide that, during the pregnancy, the surrogate must not smoke,
drink alcoholic beverages, or take any drugs without the consent of
a physician approved by the couple. 21 The surrogate and her husband
also "assume all risks including the risk of death which are incident
to conception, pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum complications." ' 22 Amniocentesis may also be stipulated so that, if the child
23
is found to be defective, the surrogate must abort the fetus.
Furthermore, there is typically a contract clause that restricts the
choice of abortion for the surrogate. The provision may read as
follows:
The Surrogate agrees that she will not abort the child once
conceived except, if in the opinion of the inseminating physician, such action is necessary for the physical health of the
Surrogate or the child has been determined by said physician
to be physiologically abnormal. In the event of either of
these two (2) contingencies, the surrogate desires and agrees
24
to have said abortion.
Through an attorney, 25 agency, 26 or private solicitation, 27 a
woman who wishes to be a surrogate can be located. The reasons a
woman would want to carry a child for another may vary. These
reasons may be categorized into five groups: (1) "[possession of]
either a sentimental or a maternal instinct, or fascination with having

20. Id. at 276-277.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

-

Id. at 283.
Id. at 275.
L.B. ANDREwS, supra note 18, at 234.
Brophy, supra note 17, at 280.
Noel Keane, a Michigan attorney, has arranged surrogate births. See P.
SINGER, supra note 10, at 116. Currently, he is a third party defendant in the
Malahoff v. Stivers controversy where the child was born with microcephaly, and
paternity tests showed that the contracting man is not the father of the child.
Telephone interview with law clerk, U.S Dist. Ct., Detroit, Michigan (January 31,
1985).
26. In Kentucky, a doctor has set up an agency entitled "Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc." P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 109. The involvement of surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. in surrogate parenting arrangements was recently challenged by the Kentucky State Attorney General. See Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Kentucky
1986). For a discussion of the case see infra note 156.
27. A trustid friend was asked to carry a child to term. Id. at 124.
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a child"; (2) a sense of altruism; (3) financial need; 21 (4) the
opportunity to undergo a 'body experience'; or (5) atonement for a
29
previous abortion.
A.

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD VIA ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD VIA IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE
DIFFERENT PROCEDURES

Surrogate 30 motherhood via artificial insemination 3 entails the
impregnation of a surrogate with sperm from the husband3 2 of an
infertile woman. The procedure, requiring only a syringe, is rather
3
simple and can easily be conducted without the aid of a physician. 1
Surrogate motherhood by way of in vitro fertilization is a more
complicated procedure. It requires the harvesting of an egg3 4 from
the wife of the couple.3 5 The egg is retrieved in an operation under
general anesthesia. This operation involves the insertion of a laparoscope,3 6 a long silvery tube, in which the doctor can view the
28. Smith, supra note 8, at 649-650.
29. Id. at 650 n.51 (citing Harris, Stand-In Mother - Maryland Woman to Bear
Child for Couple, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 3).
30. The term "surrogate" which means "substitute" is actually a misnomer.
"The natural mother, who contributes egg and uterus, is not so much a substitute
mother as a substitute spouse who carries a child for a man whose wife is infertile.
Indeed, it is the adoptive mother who is the surrogate mother, since she parents a
child borne by another." Robertson, SurrogateMothers: Not so Novel After All, 13
HASTINGS CEN. REP., Oct. 1983, at 28.
31. Surrogate motherhood via artificial insemination is currently more common
than surrogate motherhood via in vitro fertiliation. See Galen, Surrogate Law, 9
N.L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 8, col. 2.
32. See, supra note 15.
33. A friend wanted to bear a child for a couple. "They read up on artificial
insemination in ... the Reader's Digest Family Health Guide and decided they could
do it themselves." P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 25.
34. Drugs such as Clomid and Pergonal are injected in the female so that, not
only one, but many eggs can be retrieved."Howard Jones 'harvests' an average of
5.8 eggs per patient; it is possible to obtain as many as 17." The retrieval of a
number of eggs prevents repeat operations. Willis, The New Origins of Life, TIME,
Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 48. For a discussion of the use of Comid and Pergonal for the
induction of ovulation see Quigley, The Use of Ovulation-InducingAgents in InVitro Fertilization, 27 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 983 (1984).
35. There is also the possibility that the egg must be retrieved from a female
other than from the wife of the couple who wanted the child. This is beyond the
scope of this paper. Id. at 49.
36. Some clinics are now using ultrasound instead of a laparoscope. The
procedure, conducted in a doctor's office under local anesthesia, is less expensive but
also may be less reliable. Id. But see Lewin, Comparative Study of Ultrasonically
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target-a small, bluish pocket inside the ovary where the egg is
produced. Once the target is viewed, the doctor inserts a long,
hollow needle through a second incision. Through this needle, the
eggs and surrounding fluid are removed by suction. The fluid is then
examined under a microscope to determine whether it contains an
egg. If an egg is found, it is carefully washed and placed in a petri
dish containing a solution of nutrients. The petri dish is placed in

an incubator for four to eight hours. Meanwhile, the husband is
requested to produce a sperm sample.37 After a sperm sample is
produced, the sperm is prepared in a solution and added to the petri
dish that contains the egg. For the next twenty-four hours, the
incubator is set at body heat. The egg, hopefully, will fertilize and
so that the resulting embryo can be placed within the
start to divide
38
surrogate.
The procedure utilized, therefore, determines who the baby's
genetic mother will be. If the surrogate is artificially inseminated,
the surrogate is the genetic mother whereas, if the surrogate is
implanted with an embryo, the wife of the couple is the genetic
mother. Under either method, the husband of the couple providing
the sperm is the genetic father and, of course, in each situation, the
surrogate is the gestational mother. Moreover, the couple is expected
to rear the child.
B.

ARTIFICIAL WOMB

Theoretically, the embryo that results from fertilization in a
petri dish also could be implanted in an artificial womb. 9 Under
this format, a human body would not be necessary for gestation.
All aspects of conception and pregnancy would take place outside
Guided Percutaneous Aspiration with Local Anesthesia and Laparoscopic Aspiration
Follicles in an In Vitro Fertilization Program, 151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 621 (1985), in which the results of a study comparing the use of ultrasound and
a laparoscope indicated no significant difference in the number of eggs retrieved.
37. "It is hardly a romantic moment recalls [a] Cleveland Businessman ...
'You have to take the jar and walk past a group of people as you go into the
designated room, where there's an old brass bed and a couple of Playboy magazines.
They all know what you're doing and they're watching the clock, because there are
several people behind you waiting their turn." Id.
38. Id. For a more detailed description of the operation and in vitro fertilization
in general, see R.G. EDWARDS, TEST TUBE BABIES (1981).
39. An embryo has not survived implantation more than three days in vitro.
While unsuccessfully implanted, embryos have been kept alive for periods as long as
nine days. Mouse and rat embryos have sustained the equivalency of four weeks of
human embryonic life. P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 132-33.
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of the body. This procedure, known as ectogenesis, has not yet been
perfected.4o
II. THE DECISION TO ABORT
The decision whether or not to terminate the pregnancy of a
surrogate dictates analysis under Roe v. Wade.4' In Roe, the Supreme
Court held that a woman has the constitutional right to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
42
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
This fundamental right 4 3 however, is not absolute." During the first
trimester, the abortion decision is a decision to be made between the
pregnant woman and her physician. 4 5 At the end of the first trimester, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the health of
the mother and "may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health."4 The state's
compelling interest, at the end of the second trimester, is in the
potential life of the fetus and the state "may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of life or health of
47
the mother." ,
40. Published research was extensive in 1979. See generally Morris, Growing
Embryos in Vitro, 278 NATURE 402 (1979). The latest discovery is the simplification

of culture chambers for rat embryos. See generally Priscott, The Culture of 12- and
13-day Rat Embryos Using Continuous and Non-Continuous Gassing of Rotating

Bottles, 230 J. EXPER. ZOOLOGY 247 (1984). At this time, research with embryos may
be limited because ectogenesis is being studied through another method: the prolongation of the lives of premature babies.
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

42. Id. at 153.
43. Id. at 155.
44. See id. at 154. This statement should not be read out of context to enable
a couple's claim to reproduce to override the surrogate's right to abort. This statement
is pertinent in discussing the second and third trimesters of a female's pregnancy.
45. Id. at 164.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 165.
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In recognizing this right, the Court, in dicta, stressed the circumstances of the pregnant female. Justice Blackmun wrote:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise to care for it.48
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, 49 stated:
Elaborate argument is hardly necessary to demonstrate that
childbirth may deprive a woman of her preferred lifestyle
and force upon her a radically different and undesired future.
48. Id. at 153. The Court's concern for the aftermath of pregnancy has been
lessened by later cases dealing with public funding of nontherapeutic abortions. See
the following cases which were similarly decided by 6 to 3 votes: Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519
(1973). In these cases, the Court held that neither the Constitution, nor federal
legislation requires the states to provide funding of nontherapeutic abortions for
indigent women. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Beal states "I am
appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a 'right to life' that means,
under present social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor
women and their children." Beal, 432 U.S. at 456-57. In a separate dissent Blackmun,
J. joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ. reiterated the view that the majority's
approach to the indigent women's problems is "disingenuous and alarming, almost
reminiscent of 'let them eat cake'." Id. at 462. But see Harris v. McRae, 449 U.S.
297 (1980) (rejection of constitutional attacks on versions of Hyde Amendment that
limited public funding for most medically necessary abortions). However, Harris, a
5 to 4 decision as opposed to the 6 to 3 decisions in the cases dealing with
nontherapeutic abortion, indicates that medical aspects still weigh heavier than
lifestyle aspects. See also the "lifestyle" cases, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summary affirmance of federal court's dismissal of a challenge
by homosexuals to Virginia's sodomy statute); Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986) (Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy); and Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978)
(upholding discharge of two public employees who were "living together in a state
of 'open adultery."), aff'g 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1052 (1978). The Court's approach in each of these cases signifies its lack of
great concern for protecting one's lifestyle.
49. Justice Douglas' opinion is applicable to Roe v. Wade and the companion
case, Doe v. Bolton.
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For example, [a pregnant female is] required to endure the
discomforts of pregnancy; to incur pain; higher mortality
rate, and after effects of childbirth; to abandon education
plans; to sustain loss of income; to forgo the satisfactions of
careers; to tax further mental and physical health in providing
child care; and, in some cases, to hear the life long stigma
of unwed motherhood, a badge which may haunt, if not
deter, later legitimate family relationships.5 0
In both Roe and its companion opinion, Doe v. Bolton,5 it was not
necessary for the Court to distinguish between the gestational mother
and the childrearing mother since neither Jane Roe5 2 nor Mary Doe,"
the challengers of the abortion statutes,5 4 were surrogates. The type
of problems listed by the Justice's in Roe's dicta, are those experienced during the actual pregnancy and the aftermath of giving birth
to an unwanted child. Despite the lack of distinction between the
difficulties encountered by a gestational mother and those difficulties
encountered by a childrearing mother, Roe's constitutional principles
are applicable to the surrogate situation, providing the surrogate
with the constitutional basis upon which she can claim sole right to
decide whether or not to abort the child which she is carrying for
another.
The reason Roe's constitutional principles are applicable, despite
this lack of distinction, is that the opinion is primarily concerned
with the bodily integrity of the female. That is, the gestational aspect
of pregnancy and its effects on the female's health are the focal
points of the opinion. For example, the Court considers the state's
interest in the health of the mother during the first trimester but
finds that, through modern medical technology, "mortality rates for
women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal,
appear to be as low as or lower than the rates of normal childbirth." 5 5 The health of the mother is also important when determin50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 214-15 (Douglas, J., concurring).
51. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
52. Jane Roe is a pseudonym. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120, n.4.
53. Mary Doe is a pseudonym. Roe, 410 U.S. at 184, n.6.
54. In Roe, the Texas statute made it "a crime to 'procure an abortion' ...
or to attempt one, except with respect to 'an abortion procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother'." 410 U.S. at 11718. The Georgia statute in Doe was patterned upon the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, sec. 230.3. This statute contained a number of requirements
which had to be met before one could obtain an abortion. Moreover, there were
limited circumstances as to when an abortion could be procured. 410 U.S. at 182-84.
55. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149.
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ing whether the State has a compelling interest in regulating the
abortion decision during the second trimester.16 Furthermore, the
health of the mother is recognized by the Court as taking precedence
over the State's interest in the fetus during the third trimester of the
pregnancy. 7
Throughout Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court refers to the
abortion decision as a "medical decision." In Roe, the Court said
that the ". . . abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must
rest with the physician."5' 8 This medical decision is, not only one
that encompasses the physical aspects of pregnancy, but also the
emotional and psychological factors attributed to pregnancy. By
looking at these factors, the physician can assess the health of the
pregnant woman. 9 Moreover, Douglas recognizes specific rights that
reinforce the view that the abortion decision should be exercised by
the gestational mother. These rights are "the freedom to care for
one's health and person" 6 and "freedom from bodily restraint or
compulsion." '6' The first is an affirmative right, and the second
62
protects the pregnant female from intrusion.
The dicta that was referred to earlier in this section also attests
to the Court's recognition of the effect of gestation on the woman's
body. This recognition is not without support in female literature 63
and medical texts. 64 Throughout the pregnancy, ovarian hormones
(estrogen and progesterone) are produced within the female's body. 65
Morning sickness, a condition that is experienced by seventy-five to
eighty-eight percent of all pregnant women, seems to be related to

56. Id. at 164.
57. Id. at 164-65.
58. Id. at 166.
59. Doe, 410 U.S. at 215.
60. Id. at 213.
61. Id.
62. These rights are in contrast to Mill's "harm principle." The principle is
"that the government can only exercise power over an individual against his or her
will if necessary to prevent harm to others." Ehrlich, Freedom of Choice: Personal
Autonomy and the Right to Privacy, 14 IDAHO L. REv. 447, 469 (1978).
63. See generally M.L. MAROOLIS, MOTHERS AND SUCH (1984); R. FRIEDLAND
& C. KORT, The Mother's Book (1984); H. ROBERTS, WOMEN, HEALTH AND REPRODUCTION (1981).

64. See generally R.

GYNECOLOGY

65.

supra note 1; D.N. DANFORTH, OBSTETRICS AND
PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (7th ed. 1985).

BENSON,

(5th ed. 1986); J.A.

M.J. WALLACE PAXTON, THE FEMALE BODY IN CONTROL 97

(1981).
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higher levels of estrogen during pregnancy." Of course, body changes
take place as the fetus grows. For example, when sex differentiation
begins, the breasts of the pregnant woman change in that the nipples
have more pigment. When the finger and toes of the fetus appear,
the female's uterus is above the pelvic bones. When the sex differences are eventually clear, the abdomen of the gestational mother
protrudes.6 7 As the pregnancy progresses, the woman's bodily systems become more involved in the gestation of the child. The
circulatory system of the gestational mother, by the fourth week of
pregnancy, exchanges products with the circulatory system of the
embryo. By the sixteenth week, the placenta 6 is formed within the
woman. The fetus, connected with the placenta of the gestational
mother by two blood vessels (the umbilical artery and the umbilical
vein), is completely dependent upon the food and oxygen that are
brought to it via the mother's circulatory system. Carbon dioxide
and other waste products of the fetal metabolism are returned by
way of the umbilical vein to the maternal circulation. They are then
excreted by the mother's lungs and kidneys, respectively.6 9 It is
therefore expected that, because she is carrying the baby, the gestational mother will modify her choices of the commonplace activities
in which she may engage. For example, the pregnancy may inhibit
the gestational mother's usual consumption of alcohol, 70 change her
66. M.L.

MARGOLIS,

supra note 63, at 249. But see Masson, Serum Chorionic

Gonado trophin (HCG), Schwangerschafts protein 1 (SPI), Progesterone and Oestradiol Levels in Patients with Nausea and Vomiting in Early Pregnancy, 92 BRITISH J.
OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY; 211 (1985), in which the results of a study indicated
levels of human chorionic gonadotrophin (HCG), a placental protein, to be significantly higher in pregnant females with nausea and/or vomiting than those pregnant
females who were symptom free. The 116 females tested were between their nine and
sixteen gestation period.
67. M.J. WALLACE PAXTON, supra note 65, at 98.

68. The placenta is the organ of metabolic interchange between fetus and
mother. The human placenta at term averages about 1/6 to 1/7 the weight
of the fetus. It is disk-shaped, about an inch in thickness and 7 inches in
diameter. Its fetal face is smooth ...

The umbilical cord is attached,

normally near the center of the fetal face. The maternal face of a detached
placenta is rough ... After the delivery of the fetus the extruded placenta
with the torn membranes adherent to its margins and the attached umbilical
cord is called the 'afterbirth.'
(4th ed. 1976).
69. M.J. WALLACE PAXTON, supra note 65, at 100.

STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

70. "From the [scientific] evidence available the best advice to the woman
pregnant or about to become pregnant would seem to be 'Don't consume alcohol."'
J. PRITCHARD, supra note 64, at 259.
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eating habits 7' and affect her sexual relations with her husband. 72 In
addition to the physical effects of the pregnancy on the gestational
mother during the nine months of pregnancy, the female must
undergo labor, a process characterized as painful."
The above discussion has described the normal events of pregnancy and their effect on the gestational mother's body. The topic
now turns to the possible advisor effects of the pregnancy on the
health of the gestational mother who, before the pregnancy, was
diagnosed as in good health. 74 One of the major dangers for the
gestational female is toxemias of pregnancy. Toxemia is a term used
to designate a number of conditions characterized by high blood
pressure. It occurs in about six out of one hundred pregnant women,
and is the leading cause of maternal and fetal deaths.75 Half of the
toxemias are labeled as "preeclampsia." 76 A female diagnosed with
preeclampsia suffers from a combination of symptoms, including
hypertension, edema and proteinuria (protein in the urine). In a
more serious stage (eclampsia), the pregnant female undergoes convulsions and coma. Unless controlled, toxemia results in maternal
77
death.
Another ailment that may affect women during pregnancy is
hyperemesis gravidarum, characterized by severe nausea and vomiting, as distinguished from the normal experience of morning sickness
during pregnancy. During this ailment, the pregnant woman loses
weight and becomes dehydrated, disrupting her body's balance of
fluids, electrolytes and acids. 78 The pregnant woman also may suffer
71. "A daily caloric increase throughout pregnancy of 300 kcal has been
recommended by the Food and Nutrition Board." Id. at 251.Books on nutrition for
the pregnant woman have been written to help her to adjust her eating habits during
this period of her life. See generally I. CRONIN & G. BREWER, EATING FOR Two: THE
COMPLETE

PREGNANCY

NUTRITION

COOKBOOK

(1983);

J.

BROWN,

NUTRITION

FOR

YOUR PREGNANCY (1983).
72. "It has long been the custom of many obstetricians to recommend abstinence from intercourse during the last 4 weeks of pregnancy... " . PRITCHARD,
supra note 64, at 257.
73. M.J. WALLACE PAXTON, supra note 65, at 104.
74. Pregnancy also increases the health problems of women who already have
medical conditions such as diabetes or heart disease. R.K. FREEMAN & S.C. PESCAR,
SAFE DELIVERY: PROTECTING YOUR BABY DURING HIGH RISK PREGNANCY 17, 23

(1982).

75. E.

76. Id.

SLOANE,

BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 275

77. Id.

78. D. HALES & R.

(1982) [hereinafter D.

CREASY,

HALES].

(1980).

NEW HOPE FOR PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 131-32

1986:11

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

from gallbladder disease, and thus require the removal of gallstones. 79 In addition, cholestarsis of pregnancy, referred to as pregnancy jaundice, may develop. This sickness consists of itching and/
or jaundice that is caused by pregnancy-induced changes that prevent
the normal flow of bile in the liver. The symptoms, itching and
yellow-colored skin, disappear after delivery.80 Finally, a female
during pregnancy may be vulnerable to urinary tract infection.
Almost ten percent of pregnant women suffer from this ailment. An
additional five percent develop the infection after delivery. Recurrent
acute urinary tract infections during successive pregnancies often
result in chronic pyelonephritis, a major cause of death in older
females. 8
In addition to ailments during pregnancy that may affect the
female's physical well-being, there are abnormal labor complications
that may be life-threatening to the mother.8 2 Furthermore, in certain
types of abnormal delivery methods, the gestational mother may
suffer more than discomfort, but actual physical injury to herself.
For example, when an obstetrician utilizes forceps to aid the fetus
in its travels through the gestational mother's birth canal, the female
may suffer lacerations of the vagina.83
Not only are there physical aspects of gestation, but gestation
and labor also entail psychological factors. As one author states:
Pregnancy may exacerbate or reactivate a preexisting mental
illness; moreover, it may be stressful even for women who
function quite normally and who appear to be in very good
emotional health prior to conception. Thus all pregnancies,
probably without exception, are associated with some emotional upheaval.8 4
Emotions during pregnancy can be viewed in light of the trimesters. Depressive feelings are not uncommon during the first trimester.
There also may be a sense of disappointment that accompanies early
nausea, vomiting and fatigue during the first trimester. This sense
79. Although there is no evidence that pregnancy is one of the causes of
gallstones, normal physiological changes during pregnancy affect the gallbladder in
such a way that it becomes sluggish. This sluggishness could lead to the incomplete
removal of bile from the gallbladder, creating a greater risk of gallstones.Id at 133.
80. Id. at 134.
81. R. BENSON, supra note 1, at 908.
82. E. SLOANE, supra note 75, at 309.
83. D. HALES, supra note 78, at 180.
84. C. NADELSON, THE WOMAN PATIENT 68 (1978).
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of disappointment is due to the absence of an expected sense of
excitement and well-being.8 5 Late in the second trimester, women
may undergo an increased desire to be let alone. These feelings reach
their peak in the third trimester and do not leave until the postpartum
period. As she reaches term, she may become anxious due to her
concern about the process of labor and the possible difficulties that
may arise.8 6 Women, after giving birth, experience the 'baby blues',
"characterized by mild depression, anxiety and minimal clouding of
87
consciousness. ,
In many ways, these factors are more pronounced for a surrogate. As stated above, there usually is a contract provision that
8
requires the surrogate to refrain from consumption of alcohol. 1
Moreover, the surrogate and her husband are required to abstain
from sex after insemination.8 9 The surrogate also is not allowed to
view the child after birth 9° which may increase her postpartum
depression. There may be the possibility that the surrogate, later in
her years, may regret having given up the child and undergo depression as a result. Furthermore, the surrogate, during the pregnancy,
may be subjected to anxiety that the couple may refuse the child at
9
birth. The surrogate, trying to earn extra income for her family, '
would then have the burden of raising another child. This fear would
be analogous to the concerns of the aftermath of pregnancy expressed
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. 92 The anxiety may be greater for
the surrogate because she may feel that a third party has control
over this aspect of her life.
In general, the surrogate, in carrying the child, is the person
who undergoes the physical and psychological aspects of pregnancy
recognized in Roe v. Wade to support a woman's constitutional
right to abortion. These matters, in certain instances, may cause
85. Id. at 77.

86. Id.

87. A. READING, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

OF

PREGNANCY 107 (1983). But see

Ballinger, Some Biochemical Findings During Pregnancy and After Delivery in
Relation to Mood Change, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 549, (1982), in which a study
utilizing urine tests detected a distinct upswing mood between the second and fourth
days following delivery.
88. See supra note 21, and accompanying text.
89. Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:Medicolegal
Aspects of New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAm. L.Q. 199, 217-218 (1983).
90. Andrews, supra note 16, at 796.
91. A surrogate states 'The money could help pay for my children's education,'
'or just generally to make their lives better.' Willis, supra note 34, at 53.
92. See supra notes 47 and 49, and accompanying text.
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greater discomfort and unhappy consequences for the surrogate than
for a woman who carries a baby for herself. Thus the gestational
mother, whether artificially inseminated or implanted with an embryo, is the person who is constitutionally entitled to exercise the
abortion right. Under Roe v. Wade it is the process of gestation
which dictates who may exercise the right of abortion.

Ill.

No PARTY TO THE CONTRACT OR ARRANGEMENT
CAN VETO THE SURROGATE'S RIGHT TO ABORT
THE FETUS SHE IS CARRYING

As discussed in the previous section, the surrogate undergoes
the physical and psychological aspects of pregnancy that serve the
basis of the constitutional right articulated in Roe v. Wade. Under
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,93 this right
cannot be vetoed by anyone involved in the surrogate arrangement.
Planned Parenthoodaddressed the issue 94 of whether the State had
authority to require a pregnant woman to obtain the consent of her
husband before she could abort a fetus. The Supreme Court held
that the spouse's consent could not be required by the State. The
State "cannot delegate to a spouse a veto power which the State
itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the
first trimester of pregnancy." 95 "Clearly, since the State cannot
regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the
physician and his patient make the decision, the State cannot delegate
93. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

94. Another issue concerned the constitutionality of a provision requiring a
single woman under eighteen years of age to obtain the consent of a parent or a
person in loco parentis before she would be able to abort the child she was carrying
"unless the abortion [was] certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to
preserve the life of the mother." Id. at 58. The majority held that this provision was
unconstitutional. The majority also invalidated a provision prohibiting abortions by
the saline amniocentesis method. The Court, however, sustained the following
provisions: (1) a record-keeping requirement for physicians and hospitals; (2) a
provision defining viability; (3) a provision requiring written consent from the
pregnant mother before the abortion can be performed. All of these provisions of
the challenged statute (except the provision prohibiting saline amniocentesis) concerned the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
95. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
sec. 3(3), requiring [from the woman, prior to submitting to abortion during
the twelve weeks of pregnancy,] 'the written consent of the woman's spouse,
unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician. to be necessary in
order to preserve the life of the mother.'
Id. at 58.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent
abortion during that same period." (emphasis added). 96 The language
of the opinion explicitly disallows the husband of the surrogate or
the genetic father from prohibiting or regulating the surrogate's
97
abortion decision.
The argument can be made, as in the dissent, that the natural
father has an interest in having a child. Rehnquist, J., concurring
with White, J., wrote:
A father's interest in having a child-perhaps his only childmay be unmatched by any other interest in his life. See
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), and other cases
there cited. 9
This sentiment is shared by others like John T. Noonan99 who wrote
that it 'could reasonably be argued that if a father could not lose
his rights to one of his children without a hearing, even if the child
was in the mother's control, he could not lose his child within the
mother's womb without at least an opportunity to object." ° Both
Rehnquist and Noonan fail to recognize that the bodily integrity of
the mother must take precedence over the father's desire for children.
The Court in Planned Parenthoodacknowledged this balance:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and husband disagree
on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage
partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman, who
physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two,
the balance weighs in her favor. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.,
at 153.101
96. Id. at 69.

97. In a surrogate arrangement, judicial enforcement of a contract provision
regulating the surrogate's abortion decision constitutes state action. In Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action and, therefore, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated: "But for the active intervention of the
state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, [defendants] would have
been free to occupy the properties in question." 334 U.S. at 19. Likewise, in a
surrogate arrangement, the state judicial machinery is necessary to deny the surrogate
the exercise of her constitutional right.
98. PlannedParenthood,428 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist and White, JJ., dissenting).
99. See generally J.T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA
IN THE SEVENTIES

(1979) (a legal analysis of the abortion choice).

100. Imber, Abortion and the Equality of Reasons, 10
June 1980 at 44.
101. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 71.

HASTINGS CENT. REP.
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As in Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood does not distinguish
between the roles of motherhood. Yet is relevant in discussing
whether the wife has a voice in the surrogate's abortion decision.
The following analysis first considers the situation where the wife is
the genetic mother of the fetus and then examines the situation
where the surrogate is both the gestational and genetic mother.
In PlannedParenthood, a difficult balance was struck between
the female's right to abortion and the male's right to father children.
The Court recognized that the mother's gestational involvement in
the pregnancy was a factor that outweighed the genetic contribution
of parenthood. Thus, under PlannedParenthood,the genetic mother,
like the genetic father, cannot override the gestational mother's
decision. An argument, however, can be made on behalf of the
genetic mother that her physical involvement in the reproduction
process dictates that she, along with the surrogate, should decide
whether or not to terminate the pregnancy. That is, the genetic
mother, in undergoing an operation for retrieval of her eggs, must
withstand bodily discomforts and pain,10 2 making her circumstances
more closely analogous to the role of the gestational mother than to
the role played by the genetic father or surrogate's husband. Although the genetic mother may be required to undergo several
operations to retrieve eggs, 0 3 one operation or several operations
cannot compare to the nine month involvement of the gestational
mother. Furthermore, the reasons underlying the abortion decision
are totally unrelated to the operation and physical state of the
genetic mother. The genetic mother does not undergo the risks of

pregnancy. Hence the gestational mother's right cannot be shared
with the genetic mother nor vetoed by her. It follows a fortiori that,
if a genetic bond cannot be the basis of regulating the abortion
decision of the surrogate, then a wife of a sperm donor, having no

genetic (let alone gestational bond with the fetus) cannot veto the

surrogate's right.
If, under PlannedParenthood,no one can veto the right of the
surrogate to abort the fetus, the question becomes whether a contract
provision can negate the surrogate's right. Typically, the contract
will contain a provision stating,
102. A female, the next day after the operation, "felt a lot of discomfort. Her
navel was battered, her abdomen felt bruised, and she had severe gas pains from the
carbon dioxide that had been pumped into her abdomen, like blowing up a balloon,
to give doctors more room to work." Woodall, Born of Faith and Science, Phila.
Inquirer, (magazine) March 3, 1985, at 16, 19.
103. See id.
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Each party acknowledges that he or she fully understands the
agreement and its legal effect and that he or she is signing
the same fully and voluntarily and that neither party has any
reason to believe that the other(s) did not freely and voluntarily execute said agreement.' °4
A constitutional right can be waived if it is voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently waived. 0 5 A factual issue, however, may arise as to
the voluntariness of the waiver. There are women who become
surrogates because of monetary gain.106 Thus, one may wonder
whether the surrogate was coerced into accepting the contract provision as a result of the financial condition in which she finds
herself. She also may not be represented by counsel 07 so that the
waiver may not be intelligently made. Another consideration is that
a constitutional right, once waived, need not be waived forever. 08
For example, in criminal law, a suspect does not waive his right to
remain silent when he speaks.'19
The surrogate should not be able to waive her constitutional
right forever. Indeed, the surrogate, like the criminally accused, is
in a situation where personal liberty and bodily freedom may be
lost. Due to the coercive nature of custodial interrogations,"10 incriminating statements by the accused can be acquired by police officers
in order to deprive the accused of his personal liberty. Similarly, a
surrogate's signature to a contract may be used to take away the
surrogate's bodily autonomy. She, too, is part of a coercive atmosphere. The emotional nature of the topic of negotiations may engender this atmosphere. The couple's right to have a child will be
stressed by the couple's attorney"' and, at that moment, the surrogate may feel compelled to aid the couple while forgetting the

104. Brophy, supra note 17, at 283.
105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966).

106. N.P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J.

147, 147.

107. Usually the couple has a lawyer and this lawyer ends up advising the

surrogate. "Although he has recruited the surrogate, he is paid by and represents the
couple. By disclosing his conflicting interest, he has satisfied legal ethics, but he may

not serve the interests of the surrogate....." Robertson, supra note 30, at 30.
108. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445.
109. Id.
110. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441.

111. Noel Keane "would like to see [specific performance] applied to surrogacy
contracts." P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 121-22.
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physical and emotional consequences to herself.' 2 No one, including
the surrogate, may be able to envision or fully realize the consequences that may fall on the surrogate." 3 Moreover, if the surrogate
is being paid, her financial conditions may increase the pressure to
sign the contract.
An argument could be made by the natural father, however,
that he prejudicially relied on the contract provision by paying all
medical and testing expenses and, therefore, the surrogate is estopped
from rescinding the waiver of a constitutional right." 4 The response
is that the contract provision, if enforced in this situation, would
result in injustice and, therefore, would be void as against public
policy. The societal interest in protecting bodily autonomy and
human dignity of its members would be destroyed if economic rights
were able to override these values.
Assuming that under the contract clause the surrogate waived
her constitutional right on a permanent basis, there is the practical
problem of enforcing the contract provision. If a court enjoined the
surrogate from aborting the fetus, she could not be placed in jail
for contempt of the order. In addition, courts also are reluctant to
enforce a service contract, especially when the enforcement requires
court supervision." 15 Damages based on breach of contract would
not provide an adequate remedy for the couple, since the couple
wants a child," 6 not money. The couple, however, could probably
112. An attorney's description of the meeting between the surrogate and the
couple suggests this emotional coercive atmosphere that can be created:
The couples and the surrogates then meet. It is very important to 'meet,'
face to face, because this program, in our opinion, is about 2 percent
medical, about 1 percent psychological and legal, and about 97 percent a
surrogate. The surrogate looks at a couple and tells them, 'I'll carry your
baby,' and them looking back at her and saying, 'We trust you to carry the
most precious thing in our life, and that's our child, a family that we're
going to raise.'
Handel, Legal Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies-A Panel Discussion,
6 WHrrrER L. REv. 783, 786 (1984).
113. "The pregnancy and birth may entail more pain, unpleasant side effects,
and disruption than she expected. The couple may be more intrusive or more aloof
than she wishes." "Relinquishing the baby after birth may be considerably more
disheartening and disappointing than she anticipated." Robertson, supra note 30, at
30.
114. Brophy, supra note 17, at 281.
115. D. DOBBS, REMEDES 63 (1973); see also Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood:
Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REv. 71, 8586 (1982).
116. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 57-58 (1973) for general guidelines in determining
whether a legal remedy is inadequate.
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recover on the theory of unjust enrichment if the surrogate was paid
in installments rather than being promised payment at birth of the
child." 7 Again, the damages are inadequate in that the couple wants
a child. Moreover, damages for emotional distress are usually not
granted unless there is physical injury involved." 8 An argument
similar to the one advanced in Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital' 9
might succeed, but only where the surrogate is implanted with an
embryo. In Del Zio, a couple sued a doctor and a hospital for
destruction of an embryo. The embryo was to be implanted in the
genetic mother. Damages were awarded on the basis that the couple
had a property interest in the embryo. Del Zio, however, can be
distinguished from the surrogate mother procedure in that the embryo was not implanted in a human body when it was destroyed.
Thus, Del Zio may be held inapplicable where a gestational mother
is exercising her constitutional right of abortion.
A.

COUPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VS. SURROGATE MOTHER'S
RIGHT

Section III of this article argued that an individual cannot negate
the surrogate's right of abortion. This section considers whether the
natural father and his wife, as a couple, can assert any constitutionally-based rights, and whether their rights may override the surrogate's abortion right.
The right asserted by many advocates of reproductive technologies in favor of the couple is the right to procreate. This right is
deemed to be established by Skinner v. Oklahoma.' 20 In Skinner, a
statute that provided for sterilization of "habitual criminals" was
challenged as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
An habitual criminal was defined as a person "convicted two or
more times for crimes 'amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude'.' ' 2' The statute, however, expressly excluded "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts,
embezzlement, or political offenses."1 22 This distinction between the
117. "The restitution claim . . .is not aimed at compensating the [couple], but

at forcing the [surrogate] to disgorge benefits that it would be unjust for [her] to
keep." See id. at 224.
118. W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 364 (5th ed. 1984). There
are only a handful of courts that have permitted general negligence actions for
infliction of emotional distress without requiring physical injury.
119. No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (memorandum decision).
120. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id. at 537 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 195 (West 1935)).
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excepted crimes and crimes within the definition of 'habitual criminal' was held to be invidiously discriminatory, denying equal protection of the laws. In reviewing the classification, the Court applied a
strict scrutiny test. The Court wrote:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating
effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom
the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is
to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty. We mention these matters . . . in emphasis of our
view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State
makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or
otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups
or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional
123
guaranty of just and equal laws.
Analysis of the holding and language of Skinner reveals that it does
not support an affirmative right to procreate nor an affirmative
right to actively pursue procreation using reproductive technologies.
"The procreative right recognized in Skinner was simply a right to
remain fertile, and not an uninhibited right to engage in potentially
' 124
procreative conduct.
Nor does Griswold v. Connecticut 25 supply the basis for a
couple's constitutional right to procreate via the new reproductive
technologies. In Griswold, a statute 126 that prohibited the use of
contraceptives to married persons was held unconstitutional. The
married couple's right to use contraceptives was held to be within a
protected zone of privacy.1 27 Justice Douglas stated:

123.
124.
263, 281
125.

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L.
(1984).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).

126. The section of the statute reads as follows:

REV.

ANY PERSON WHO USES ANY

DRUG, MEDICINAL ARTICLE OR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING CONCEPTION SHALL BE FINED NOT LESS THAN FIFTY DOLLARS OR IMPRISONED NOT LESS THAN
SIXTY DAYS NOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR OR BE BOTH FINED AND IMPRISONED.

Id. at 480.

127. The right of privacy is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Justice

Douglas, in his majority opinion in Griswold, held that the constitutional basis of
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We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rightsolder than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
1 28
(emphasis added).
In describing the statute being struck down, Justice Douglas further
stated:
The law . . . operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of
129
that relation. (emphasis added).
The married couple's right is not a right to reproduce, but a
right to use contraceptives to prevent reproduction. Griswold does
not establish an affirmative right of reproduction. "Freedom to have
sex without reproduction does not" serve as the basis for a claim
that a couple is free "to have reproduction without sex."'3 0 In
addition, this right that is recited in Griswold is rooted in intimacy.'3 '
The language in Griswold focuses on the intimacy of the sexual
relations between a man and a woman. This focus is further illustrated by Justice Douglas' comment: "Would we allow the police to
search sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? ' ' 3 2 Hence the couple's right to decide to
prevent conception is 'largely subsumed within a broad right of
marital privacy' which 'stress(es) the unity and independence of the
the right of privacy are penumbras emanating from "specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights." 381 U.S. at 484. The penumbra is necessary to make the specific guarantee
meaningful. Justice Douglas' opinion does not provide the sole view as to what
constitutes the source of the "right to privacy." Justice Goldberg, in his concurring
opinion, stated that the source is the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 489. Both Justice
Harlan and Justice White held that the challenged statute in Griswold was unconstitutional in that it deprived married couples " 'liberty' without due process of law,
as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 502.
128. Id. at 486.
129. Id. at 482.
130. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983).
131. See generally, T. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv.
233 (1977).
132. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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married couple and forbids undue inquiry into conjugal acts."" 3 3 3 4
Even if Griswold is read to establish a right to procreate,
Justice Douglas' emphasis on the intimacy of marital relations'"
distinguishes Griswold from a couple's arrangement with a surrogate
for the purposes of reproduction. Griswold does not encompass the

circumstances where a third party must be secured for purposes of
reproduction. The involvement of a third party, by definition,

negates the intimacy that two people share in their relations. The
methods used, such as artificially inseminating the surrogate or
fertilizing an egg in a petri dish, are totally distinct from the intimate
relations encompassed by Griswold.

The rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in

Lovisi v. Slayton,13 6 however, is applicable to surrogate arrange-

ments. Lovisi involved a married woman who was convicted under
a state sodomy statute'37 for acts of fellatio she performed on both
133. Smith & Iraola, supra note 124, at 282.
134. There are commentators and attorneys who argue that Supreme Court
decisions can be read to establish a constitutional right to procreate. See P. REILLY,
GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY. 213 (1977); Handel, supra note 112, at 788;
Robertson, supra note 130.
135. The right asserted in Griswold can be expressed in terms of "the freedom
of intimate association." See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 642 (1980).
136. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
This case has been criticized by commentators.See Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Right
to Privacy-Husbandand Wife Who Permit Third Party to Observe Their Sexual
Activities Waive Right to marital Privacy. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976), 8 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 707 (1976-1977) and
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Right of Privacy-MarriedCouple Relinquished Right of
Privacy by Engaging in Oral-Genital Contact in the Presence of Another-Lovisi v.
Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L. W. 3395 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1976), 25 EMORY L.J. 959 (1976). It is asserted that the Lovisi majority erred in
applying fourth amendment principles in a case involving marital intimacies. The
right of privacy in Griswold, under certain circumstances, is distinct from the right
of privacy based upon the fourth amendment, but common sense dictates that the
Griswold relation entails a reasonable expectation of privacy. The fourteenth amendment's right of privacy may be broader than 'the fourth amendment, but that does
not negate the fact that the fourteenth amendment's right of privacy contains aspects
of the fourth amendment. That is, Griswold may not require that a couple's sexual
relations take place per se in the bedroom or house, but as a practical matter, it does
require that it not take place in public streets. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
137. The Virginia Statute reads as follows:
CRIMES AGAINST NATURE. -IF ANY PERSON SHALL CARNALLY KNOW IN ANY MANNER
ANY BRUTE ANIMAL, OR CARNALLY KNOW ANY MALE OR FEMALE PERSON BY THE ANUS
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her husband and a third party. These consensual acts of fellatio
were performed in the couple's bedroom. 3 ' The Lovisi court stated
that the right of privacy exists only in circumstances in which it may
be reasonably expected. Once a third party is accepted as a viewer
or participant in the marital bedroom, there is no longer any
constitutional protection. As a result, the court held that the married
couple had waived their right of privacy. 319 Like the couple in Lovisi,
the couple hiring a surrogate waives their right of privacy under the
fourteenth amendment. If the married couple does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when there is an onlooker or
participant in the marital chambers, it follows that a married couple
should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they take
the reproduction process outside the marital chambers. Reproduction
by its nature entails intimacy that is lacking when a third party is
involved in the process and/or is taken outside the bedroom. The
Constitution protects the intimacy of private marital sexual rela-

tions. 140

Furthermore, other cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird 41 and
Carey v. Population Services InternationaI42 do not support a procreation right or, more specifically, a right to conceive. In Eisenstadt,
the Supreme Court held that a statute 43 that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was unconstitutional.
The case was purportedly decided on the basis of a minimum

OR BY OR WITH THE MOUTH, OR VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO SUCH CARNAL KNOWLEDGE,
HE OR SHE SHALL BE GUILTY OF A FELONY AND SHALL BE CONFINED IN THE PENITENTIARY
NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR NOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS.

Lovisi, 539 F.2D AT 350 N.1 (CITING VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1950) (repealed
1975)).
138. Photographs were taken of the Lovisis' sexual acts. Lovisi, 539 F.2d at
350.
139. Id.at 351.
140. Id. at 351. Constitutional protection has not been extended to the intimacy
of private homosexual relations. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney and Bowens
v. Hardwick, supra note 48.
141. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
142. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
143. The statute provides a "maximum five-year term of imprisonment for
whoever ...

gives away ...

any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for

the prevention of conception, except as authorized in Sec. 21A." Under Sec. 21A,
[a] registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs
or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [And a] registered
pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish drugs or articles
to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician.' Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440-441.
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rationality-equal protection ground. 1" There is, however, language
in Eisenstadt that speaks of fundamental rights doctrine:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the

individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to45bear or beget a child.
(emphasis added except "individual")

A divided court in Carey invalidated restrictions on the distri-

bution of nonprescription contraceptives. The challenged provi-

sion,' 4 6 inter alia prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to

persons over sixteen years of age by anyone other than a licensed
pharmacist. Justice Brennan insisted that the "compelling state
interest" test apply. He stated:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the

very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.
...where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear
or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden
on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and
47
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.
Justice Brennan also looked at post-Roe decisions

48

to assert "that

the same test must be applied to state regulations that burden the

individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or terminate
pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means effectuating
that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision
49
entirely." (emphasis added).1
144. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447. "The question .

.

. is whether there is some

ground of difference that rationallyexplains the different treatments accorded married
and unmarried persons under Massachusetts [statute]." (emphasis added). G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 588

(10th ed. 1980).

145. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
146.
Under New York Educ. Law § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972), it is a crime
(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a
minor under the age of 16 years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and (3) for
anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives.

Carey, 431 U.S. at 681.
147. Id. at 686.

148. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central

Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
149. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
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In these cases, the Supreme Court did not recognize a right to
procreate nor a more limited right to conceive. Rather, the emphasis
was placed on the prevention of conception and government's intrusion on that right. The language "whether to bear or beget a child"
cannot be read out of context. That is, the language cannot be read
independently of the factual situation. Each case dealt with contraceptives and the prevention of conception, not an affirmative right
to conceive.
Assuming that the couple does have a constitutional right to
conceive via the reproductive technologies, this fundamental right
cannot be absolute."10 The government can assert a compelling state
interest to justify interference with the exercise of the couple's
right. 5' Moreover, the couple's right may be less than fundamental
if the wife is capable of bearing a child, but does not want to
undergo the inconvenience of pregnancy. The government would
then have to show only a rational basis for restricting the exercise
52
of that right.
One of the few cases dealing directly with reproduction by the
hiring of a surrogate is Doe v. Kelly.' In Doe, a couple filed a
complaint in a Michigan circuit court 5 4 for a declaratory judgment,
declaring adoption statutes' unconstitutional. Their challenge was
based on the claim that the surrogate arrangement was within their
constitutional "right of privacy," the government did not have a
compelling state interest to invade that area of privacy, and the

150. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. Id.

152. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
153. No. 78-815531, slip op. (Wayne Co. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1980) cited in M.H.

SHAPIRO & R.G. SPECE, JR., BIoETHics AND LAW:CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

537 [hereinafter M.H. Shapiro].
154. The decision was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, 106 Mich.
App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). Justice Brennan
would grant certiorari.
155. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.

§ 710.54 (West 1986):

(1) Except for changes and fees approved by the court, a person shall not
offer, give or receive any money for other consideration (sic) or thing of
value in connection with any of the following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 710.69 (West 1986):

A person who violates any of the provisions of section 41 and 54 of this
chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon any
subsequent conviction shall be guilty of a felony.
M.H. SHAPIRo, supra note 153 at 537-38.
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statute was not sufficiently narrow. The court dismissed this claim

and ruled on a more limited issue:

It is this Court's opinion that a contract to use statutory
authority of the Probate Court to effect the adoption of a
child wherein such contract provides for valuable compensation, is not deserving of, nor is it within the constitutional
protection of the right of privacy as defined by the many
cases of the United States Supreme Court.'5 6
The court, however, in dictum, assumed the constitutional right of
privacy applied to the couple's arrangement with the surrogate, and
considered whether the state had a compelling interest. The Court
found that the state had a compelling interest in preventing commercialism from affecting a mother's decision to execute a consent
to the adoption of her child.' 5 7 The court stated:
156. M.H. SHAPIRo, supra note 153 at 539. Two recent rulings, however, have
not followed Doe in determining the applicability of similar state adoption statutes
to surrogate motherhood arrangements in which the surrogate is artificially inseminated. In Surrogate Parenting Assoc. Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
Attorney Gen., 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
Surrogate Parenting Associates' (SPA) involvement in the surrogate parenting procedures did not violate Kentucky's adoption statute which prohibits the buying and
selling of babies. The court reasoned that there are significant differences between
the surrogate parenting procedures in which SPA takes part and the buying and
selling of babies as contemplated by the Kentucky statute. The Court stated:
There is no doubt that [the statute] is intended to keep baby brokers from
overwhelming an expectant mother or the parents of a child with financial
inducements to part with the child. But the contral fact in the surrogate
parenting procedure is that the agreement . . . is entered into before
conception. The essential considerations for the surrogate mother when she
agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure are not avoiding the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear of the financial burden of child
rearing [but in assisting a couple who is unable to conceive a child in the
customary manner.]
Id. at 211. These differences placed the surrogate parenting procedure beyond the
scope of the adoption statute. The court, however, noted that according to state law,
the contractual arrangement regarding the surrendering of custody by the surrogate
and termination of the surrogate's parental rights is voidable for five days following
the birth of the child.
In another case, Matter of Baby Girl, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
(Nassau County Surrogate Ct.), the Surrogate ParentingAssociates, Inc. ruling was
followed. In upholding a $10,000.00 payment to a surrogate mother, the court ruled
that the payment was not foreclosed by New York's adoption statute, and requested
that the legislature review the legality of surrogate arrangements.
157. Id. at 539.
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Mercenary considerations used to create a parent-child relationship and its impact upon the family unit strikes at the
is patently and necvery foundation of human society and
58
community.
the
to
injurious
essarily
Hence, in view of the Court, the adverse impact on society and the
child clearly outweighed any interest of the contracting parties.
Doe v. Kelly illustrates the strong public policy against baby
selling that can be asserted to void an agreement that provides for
compensation to a surrogate. The next question is whether there is
a compelling state interest to restrict the couple's right when no
compensation is involved. The following interests that may be asserted by the state will be discussed consecutively:
(1) the protection of familial values'1659
0
(2) prevention of harm to the child
6
(3) protection of the female with low economic status '
(4) the protection of societal values of personal autonomy and
bodily integrity.
It will be argued that state interests (1) and (2) would not withstand
strict scrutiny, but would pass muster under the rational basis test.
State interests (3) and (4) could not be asserted to entirely prohibit
surrogate motherhood. State interest (3), however, would prohibit
payment for surrogate motherhood and state interest (4) would
prohibit contract provisions regulating the surrogate's abortion right.
In that way, state interests (3) and (4) would satisfy the requirements
that the state interest be "compelling" and that the statute be
narrowly drawn to further a state interest.
At first glance, the protection of familial values seems to be a
compelling state interest. "Collaborative reproduction confuses the
lineage of children and destroys the meaning of family as we know
it.' ' 62 The same argument, however, can be asserted against the
adoption system. Yet adoption has not been found to be detrimental
to familial values. 6a This interest would not withstand strict scrutiny,
but would serve as a rational basis for denying women access to the
use of surrogates for reproduction purposes if the women simply
158. Id. at 539-40.
159. Robertson, supra note 30, at 29.
160. Id. at 30.

161. Waiters, Human In Vitro Fertilization:A Review of the Ethical Literature,

9 HASTINGS CENT. REP. Aug. 1979 at 23, 32.

162. Robertson, supra note 30, at 30.
163. Id.
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felt inconvenienced by pregnancy. A woman should not be able to
establish different familial lines because she is inconvenienced by
adhering to traditional family patterns.
Preventing harm to the child may also be asserted as a state
interest. Although surrogacy is analogous to adoption in that the
child may have intense desires to know his biological mother or
where he came from, the child may be more prone to psychological
problems when he learns that his biological mother not only gave
him up for adoption, but never had any intention of mothering
him. 6 4 This argument also would fail under the compelling state
interest test because there is no direct evidence that a child would
suffer greater harm from being born of a surrogate arrangement
where adoption is decided before conception than with traditional
adoption patterns. 165 "The fact that adoption through surrogate
mother contracts is planned before conception does not increase the
chance of identity confusion, lowered self-esteem, or the blurring of
lineage that occurs with adoption."' 66 Moreover, it is not unusual
for a surrogate to see the child on a regular basis. 67 By seeing the
child, the surrogate contact may erase the child's feeling of rootlessness, as well as feelings of rejection.
The state may also assert an interest in protecting economicallydisadvantaged women who may be coerced into accepting surrogate
motherhood by financial pressures. 6 This interest is compelling in
that public policy opposes the renting of a body. This interest,
however, could not be used to argue against surrogate motherhood
except where a fee is rendered. As stated earlier, there are women
who want to be a surrogate for reasons other than monetary gain. 69
The promotion of the societal values of personal autonomy and
bodily integrity would serve as a compelling state interest that would
override the right to procreate via surrogate motherhood when the
surrogate arrangement entails regulation of the surrogate's right to
abortion. This state interest represents an indirect assertion of the
surrogate's right to bodily integrity. The female body cannot be used
by others as a baby machine. Otherwise, the value that society
164. Annas, Contract to Bear a Child: Compassion or Commercialism?, 11

Aug. 1979 at 23, 32.
165. Id.
166. Robertson, supra note 30, at 30.

HASTINGS CENT. REP.

167. A surrogate remained close to the couple, and was referred to as "Auntie
Sue." P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 125.
168. See supra note 28, and accompanying text.
169. Id.
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attaches to the integrity of the individual would be destroyed. In
order to protect the dignity of the individual in society, the state
must not allow the couple to dictate what the surrogate can and
cannot do with her body. The person who owns that body thinks
and has feelings. The surrogate may initially decide to use her body
to bear a child for a couple, but that does not mean that she cannot
70
she has sole
change her mind. As emphasized in Roe v. Wade,
control of her body, and this value takes precedence over procrea71
tion.
B.

ALTERNATIVES TO VETOING THE SURROGATE'S DECISION
WHETHER OR NOT TO ABORT.

As discussed above, the surrogate's right to decide whether or
not to abort the child cannot be vetoed by anyone, including the
couple who participate in a surrogate arrangement. Moreover, the
couple does not have an overriding right to reproduce via surrogate
motherhood. Yet this has not deterred couples from seeking surrogates for the birth of a child. Surrogate motherhood is a current
reality. 7 2 The question is whether there are alternatives that, instead
of vetoing the surrogate's right, would accommodate both the surrogate's abortion right and the couple's wishes. Also, when the
surrogate does exercise her right contrary to the couple's wishes,
there is a question of what remedies are available to rectify the
situation or alleviate any negative impact on society.
Whether the surrogate is artificially inseminated or implanted
with an embryo, the objective of the couple is to secure a healthy
baby. 73 The societal interest is to protect the child from entering an
environment detrimental to its well-being. Society's concern cannot
justify an absolute veto of the surrogate's right to abort, but
accommodations can be made so that society's objective can be
attained. Accommodations, however, cannot guarantee that the couple will be satisfied with the resulting circumstances. Moreover, from
the couple's perspective, remedies may be inadequate when these
accommodations fail.
170. Of course, there are limitations during the second and third trimesters. See
supra notes 43-46, and accompanying text.
171. The extensive physical involvement of the surrogate dictates this hierarchy

of values. See supra notes 65-86 and accompanying text; cf. L.H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 924 (1978).

TRIBE, AMERICAN

172. Over one hundred (100) completed surrogate transfers in the United States
41 Bench and B. Minn.
have taken place. Gorlin & Miley, Surrogate Parenting ....
Jan. 1984 at 17.
173. The couple, however, may change their mind or circumstances such as
divorce may arise where the couple's goal is prevention of the child's birth.
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Whatever alternatives may be available, they should be set forth
in legislation rather than settled by private arrangements. Legislation
would provide notice and uniformity lacking in case-by-case adjudications of private contracts in a new field of law. 74 Parties would
be aware of their rights and liabilities prior to any arrangement so
that later tragedies may be avoided.17 Moreover, each party would
be aware of any risk in engaging in the activity and would be able
to assess the pros and cons of entering into a surrogate arrangement.
By legislation, the stability of familial relations and responsibilities
of parenthood on an uniform basis also would be established.
Legislation should be separated into four categories:
(1) preventive measures; (2) dispute resolution; (3) remedial measures; and (4) liability of the surrogate. In turn, each category should
focus on the situations where, a normal child is born against a
couple's wishes; a defective child is born; and no child is born. For
example, as to preventive measures, the incorporation of contractual
provisions 76 and practice in private arrangements such as the screening of potential surrogates may ensure the birth of a healthy baby
174. One of the characteristics of adjudication is that a specific factual dispute
where rights are affected must occur first before guidance on the matter is given. See
generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HAgv. L. REv. 353
(1977-78).
175. Malahoff v. Stivers is representative of the terrible circumstances that may
arise if surrogate arrangements are not governed by statute. In this case, Mr. Malahoff
contracted with Judy Stivers to give birth to a child for him. Mrs. Stivers was
inseminated with Mr. Malahoff's sperm; however, paternity tests revealed that Mr.
Malahoff was not the natural father of the child carried by Mrs. Stivers. Mrs. Stivers
had engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband immediately prior to being
artificially inseminated. The child, born with microcephaly (a disorder indicating
possible mental retardation), was unwanted by Mr. Malahoff and, at the same time,
the surrogate felt no bond with the child. The state finally intervened and became
the guardian of the child. The case is now in federal district court in Detroit,
Michigan. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, A.B.A.J., August 1984, at 50, 56. (It is at the discovery stage. Telephone
interview with law clerk, U.S. Dist. Ct., Detroit, Michigan (January 31, 1985)). A
Michigan legislator, Richard Fitzpatrick, has unsuccessfully tried to pass three
different versions of surrogate motherhood bills. L.B. ANDREWS, supra note 18, at
237-41.
176. One commentator writes:
Private contracts working in tandem with the court system are inadequate
to deal with the multiplicity of issues presented. The issues are too numerous
to be dealt with in the courts on a case by case basis; private contracts alone
are often too myopic and vague to deal with the complexities of the issue.
Mady, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.L.M. 323 at 345 (1981).

However, this should not prevent legislators from borrowing these provisions when
they are found to be clear regulatory devices.
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without the need to request a surrogate to exercise her abortion right
in agreement with the couple's wishes.
Two contractual provisions that could be mandated by the
legislature as standard in a surrogate contract are the clause that
requires the surrogate, during pregnancy, to abstain from alcohol,
smoking and drugs unprescribed by a physician, and the clause that
requires the surrogate to undergo amniocentesis. The first provision
would be enforced by requiring the surrogate, during the pregnancy,
to undergo toxicological testing at each visit with her doctor. The
female would be required to consent to this type of testing even
before she would be accepted as a surrogate. She would have to
undergo toxicological testing during the screening process to determine whether she already practices these unhealthy habits. If she
does not consent, she cannot be considered a candidate for surrogacy. 7 7 In addition, it would be essential that the surrogate consent
to amniocentesis before she would be considered. The combination
of these two provisions would enable the surrogate's doctor to
monitor the course of the pregnancy. These provisions, however,
are not fool-proof in securing a healthy baby. For example, amniocentesis does not identify all possible defects.'
In addition, a
scheduled toxicological test will not reveal the use of drugs that can
easily escape the body.179 It would be impractical, however, for a
court of law to conduct and enforce "surprise" examinations.
The screening of a potential surrogate would necessitate toxicological testing, a physical examination, genetic testing and psycho177. This is not an unusual method in insuring applicants who are drug-free.
Firms and corporations are now requiring job applicants to undergo urine tests to
determine whether an applicant engages in drug use. If the applicant does not take
the test, he cannot be considered for the employment position. Whether this is an
invasion of privacy in this context is yet to be seen as the suits are now being brought
into court. Collins, Drugs tests are the newest hurdle for many job applicants, Phila.
Inquirer, Apr. 7, 1985, at 1-A, 14-A. In the surrogate context, the State can claim
that the protection of unborn children is compelling.
178.
Amnicentesis, fetoscopy, and ultrasound techniques have dramatically increased our ability to detect fetal disorders antenatally. It is now possible
to diagnose virtually all chromosome abnormalities, over 100 inborn errors
of metabolism, biochemical and monogenic disorders, and an increasing
number of structural abnormalities.
D.N. DANFORTH, supra note 64, at 43.
179. Traces of marijuana may be detected as many as 80 to 90 days after the
drug has been used whereas cocaine disappears from the urine in several days to one
week. Collins, supra note 177, at 14-A, col. 6. See also R. BUSELT, DISPOSITION OF
Toxic DRUGS AND CHEMICALS IN MAN (2d ed. 1982).
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logical studies. An investigation of the couple also should be
conducted. 80 The couple's physical, emotional and mental capabilities to engage in this reproductive arrangement and to rear a child
resulting from this process should be assessed. Both the surrogate
and the couple must be informed of the surrogate's absolute right
on
of abortion and circumstances that may follow.' 8' The surrogate,
812
plight.
couple's
the
of
aware
made
be
should
the other hand,
Once the screening process is completed, the surrogate should
attend a specific number of mandatory prenatal care sessions. Furthermore, once she is pregnant, the surrogate should be required to
83
undergo periodic medical examinations by a doctor selected by the
surrogate with the approval of the couple. In addition, the State
may find it beneficial to require the surrogate to attend surrogate
group meetings for emotional support during the pregnancy. These
meetings might enable the surrogate to feel secure in her decision to
carry the baby to term and enable her to deal with any feelings of
attachment to the fetus that may develop. The State also may allow
the surrogate to know the identity of the couple so that the couple
and surrogate can develop a trusting relationship. This relationship
may secure the surrogate's cooperation in matters concerning abortion. The problem, from the couples perspective, would be that the
surrogate may want to continue relations with the couple and the
child after the child is born.
Record-keeping provisions may also be a part of surrogate
legislation. The State would maintain records of results of each
surrogate arrangement. That is, the record would contain the following information: whether a child was born; whether the child was
born with a defect; if so, what was determined to be the cause of
the defect; and whether the surrogate exercised her abortion right
180. These investigations would be analogous to those conducted during the

typical adoption process. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2724 (Purdon, 1981).

181. "Before undertaking one of these procedures, couples should discuss freely
their feelings about the technique and about the various potential outcomes." "They
should discuss all possible scenarios that might occur even if at the moment they
seem inconceivable." L.B. ANDREWS, supra note 18, at 262.
182. The surrogate should understand that the couple has become involved in a
surrogate arrangement because it was a last resort to have a family. W. HANDEL,
supra note 112, at 786. Yet every effort should be made so that the surrogate does
not feel coerced. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
183. The doctor also would be responsible for monitoring the surrogate's intake
of alcohol and drugs. Since the doctor initially would be chosen by the surrogate,
the doctor would be viewed as less of an intruder or adversary by the surrogate when
he monitors her.
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contrary to the wishes of the couple. This file would be kept
confidential except in assessing a returning applicant for surrogacy.
The couple, thus, would be provided with a method of notification.
Once a surrogate seeks readmission to the screening process, her
file would be opened to assess her potential cooperation with the
couple. For example, a surrogate who has capriciously aborted a
child would not be hired again. 84 This, however, may be construed
as a measure to punish the surrogate for exercising her constitutional
right. Indeed, surrogates may be deterred from exercising their right
in fear of not being hired again. Moreover, the utility of this
procedure may be of limited use for the couple because it only
provides the couple with notification of a previous exercise by a
surrogate. It is yet to be known whether surrogacy will attract
"career" surrogates, and whether any surrogate who was uncooperative in a specific arrangement would try to be a surrogate again.
The major obstacle to this record-keeping provision is the
constitutional claim of invasion of privacy. Since Planned Parenthood,'85 courts have invalidated record-keeping requirements where
the names of women who have undergone abortions are not kept
confidential.' 8 6 An alternative approach would be to use recordkeeping provisions for statistical information. The couple could then
make an informed decision as to whether they want to reproduce
via surrogacy, yet the name of a surrogate would not be disclosed.
The utility of this procedure is more limited than the previous
suggested approach to record-keeping because the couple will not
know if a career surrogate has been uncooperative in the past.
A form of notification of the couple that may be beneficial falls
under the second category of legislation, dispute resolution. The
surrogate would be required to notify the State that she intends to
exercise her right to abort.'8 7 At this point, the surrogate would be
requested to submit to counseling sessions before the surrogate could
exercise her right. If a court after counseling found that the surrogate
184. One author writes:
The state may decide that a uterine mother who capriciously aborts a fetus
should be barred from further third-party pregnancies and should be subject
to other sanctions.
P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 221.
185. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

186. L.D.

WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE

51, 58 (1980).

187. The couple would not be notified until after the counseling process is
completed. Otherwise, the notification may be viewed as a restraint on the surrogate's
right to abortion. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (1982).
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was resolute concerning her decision, the court would allow the
abortion right to be exercised. If, however, the court found the
8
surrogate was insecure, the court would order further counseling
8
9
without hindering her ability to eventually exercise her right. This
requirement of counseling would most likely withstand constitutional
challenge in that it would probably be viewed as a confirmation of
the surrogate's independent decision. The couple may have used
coercion, and the counseling sessions assure the State that the
surrogate is exercising her free will. 9°
Despite any notice provisions, counseling, and various precautions, a surrogate may be chosen who will carry a defective child' 9'
who ultimately may not be aborted by the surrogate when the couple
requests otherwise. Also, the surrogate, despite precautions, may
abort a healthy child against the couple's wishes. Thus, remedial
measures, the third category of legislation, must be pursued. Remedial measures should be implemented to ensure the child's well
being, and to ensure that the surrogate will not be deterred from
exercising her abortion right. Adherence to these guidelines dictates
that the couple should be required to keep the child, regardless of
whether the child is born normal or defective, and irrespective of
the cause of the defect. If the couple dies, the surrogate could be
given the option of keeping the child or placing the child for
adoption. The surrogate should not be required per se to keep the
child. If that were the case, the rearing of the child could be viewed
as a punitive measure against the surrogate for exercising her abortion right. 92 The surrogate would be placed in the detrimental
position that the Supreme Court recognized in Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton. Moreover, the return of the child to the surrogate
would undermine the dignity of the child as a human individual.
Whether or not the surrogate is compensated, the child, if returned
188. This is similar to the counseling requirements in the Pennsylvania Divorce
Code for no-fault divorces. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 202 (Purdon 1984).
189. The court must exercise its discretion in light of Roe v. Wade. See supra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
190. The counseling requirement would be analogous to the written consent
required by the pregnant woman in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth.
See supra note 94. The written confirmation was unconstitutional since it assured the
doctor of the female's decision.
191. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
192. Child care work entails 4,000-5,000 wet, dirty diapers per child, "months
or years of disturbed nights, loss of personal freedom, [and] many extra hours of
domestic work per week per child." A. OAKLEY, WOMEN CONFINED: TowARDS A
SOCIOLOGY OF CHILD BIRTH

61-62 (1980).
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to the surrogate, would be treated by the couple as an unwanted
item or product. The child should not be valued as an item on the
market, but should be valued as an unique human being, incapable
of replication or improvement. 193
The couple should be held responsible for the resulting child,
not only on a financial basis, but also on an emotional, physical
and mental basis. This responsibility cannot be delegated to another
adopting couple or an institution. In the typical family arrangement,
a couple has the option of rearing a defective child, placing it in an
institution, or placing the child for adoption. The couple who
engages a surrogate for reproduction purposes should not have these
options. This distinction is justified by the nature of the couple's
decision. In the typical surrogate arrangement, the couple has already
considered all avenues of reproduction 94 and surrogacy is the last
resort. It is a more calculated approach to pregnancy as opposed to
the pregnancy that was unexpected or the pregnancy that was planned
without the use of a third party. 95 Moreover, involvement of a third
party requires the couple to give more consideration to the aftermath
of the pregnancy. There is an opportunity to discuss matters. Because
of this opportunity, the couple should be required, before the
pregnancy, to assure society that it can provide a beneficial environment for the child. That is, a determination must be made that the
couple, without feelings of resentment, will be capable of rearing a
child, defective or not defective. If the couple refuses the child after
the birth or intentionally provides the child with an unhappy, abusive
home life, the couple will not be allowed to engage in surrogacy
again. Moreover, the couple will remain responsible for the child's
financial support. These measures should prove successful because
the couple who seeks surrogacy desperately wants a child, and would
not risk non-access to the only reproductive means available. 96 The
193. See generally Keniston, 'Good Children' (Our Own), 'Bad Children' (Other
MAG. 6 (1974).
194. Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation,
44 LA. L. REv. 1641, 1655 (1984).
195. Lori B. Andrews stresses that 'surrogate motherhood' should not be rushed
into. "There is time to carefully consider whether it is right for [the couple] and, if
it is, at what time."For example, "since the wife does not physically take part in the
reproductive process, she does not have to speed the process for fear that her
reproductive clock will run out. She does not have to hurry into childbearing like the
woman who gets married in her mid-thirties and feels she must begin having children
immediately before she goes into menopause." L.B. ANDREws, supra note 18, at
201.
196. The argument can be made that these proposals would deny the couple's
People's), and the Horrible Work Ethic, 37 YALE ALUMNi
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couple also could be held liable for damages for emotional injury to
the abandoned child. 197 As to additional financial security for the
child, the couple should be required to post bond' 9s should also be
required to purchase a life insurance policy for the child.' 99
Although the couple would be required to take custody of the
child, the surrogate should not escape responsibility for any actions
detrimental to the child's well-being. For example, if the surrogate
lied or failed to disclose pertinent information (i.e., use of drugs)
she should be denied compensation and be denied the opportunity
to be a surrogate for future couples. In addition, the couple who
selected the surrogate should be awarded punitive damages. Punitive
sanctions should be imposed so that this type of conduct will be
deterred. The problem is that the surrogate may be judgmentproof.2°° If it is discovered that the-surrogate violated the contractual
provision concerning consumption of unnatural substances, she should
not be compensated for the remaining months of the pregnancy.
This remedy is only available if the surrogate is paid in installments.
Also, both the couple and child 20' should be able to seek recovery
for any resulting injury that can be proved to be the result of the
surrogate's negligence and/or breach of contract. Again, the remedy
may be meaningless if the surrogate is judgment-proof. 2 2 The plaintiffs also must overcome a proof problem as to proximate cause. It
is difficult in certain circumstances to determine the cause of a
resulting child's defect. 20 3 If no child is born, the couple is left with
2 4
no adequate remedy. 0
right to reproduce. It, however, has been established that the couple has no right to
reproduce via reproductive technologies. See supra text accompanying notes 120-49.
Assuming the couple does have this right, this right is not absolute. The protection
of a child would be a compelling state interest.
197. Comment, Defining the Parent's Duty after Rejection of Parent-Child
Immunity: Parental Liability for Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 VAD.
L. REv. 775 (1980). This remedy, however, may be available against the surrogate.
Lorio, supra note 194, at 1662.
198. Richard Fitzpatrick, a Michigan legislator, has drafted a bill requiring the
sperm donor to execute a bond in favor of the state. Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg.
Sess. cited in Lorio, supra note 194, at 1662 n. 124.
199. Seligmann, Pregnancy by Proxy, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 72.
200. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147,
167 (1980).
201. See generally Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort
Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 325
(1984).
202. See supra note 200.
203. Mady, supra note 176, at 335.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19.
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As the above discussion demonstrates, there are presently a
number of inadequacies for the couple in securing a healthy child
through a surrogate arrangement. Of course, no legal remedy provides an aggrieved party a perfect solution. Yet the couple who
desperately seeks a healthy child probably feels these inadequacies
more than, for example, the person who contracts to buy a car and
receives damages instead. No damages or denial of payment to the
surrogate will ever replace a healthy child nor will damages for
prenatal injuries ever rectify the defects of a child. Furthermore, the
couple involved in a surrogate arrangement resulting in a defective
child or no child may undergo greater feelings of disappointment
than a couple that has control of the abortion right. A more ideal
solution for the couple lies in the use of an artificial womb. With
an artificial womb, no surrogate can claim an absolute right of
abortion. Since there is literally no body involved in carrying the
embryo, the genetic parents of the embryo would be able to decide
20 5
for themselves whether they wished to terminate the pregnancy.
IV. CONCLUSION

In general, the right of abortion in the surrogate motherhood
arrangement can be exercised only by the gestational mother, the
surrogate, since her physical autonomy is most affected by the
pregnancy. This conclusion is dictated by Roe v. Wade. Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth further provides that no one, including the
genetic mother, can veto this right, for the gestational effects of
pregnancy determine who can exercise the right. Furthermore, the
couple cannot claim a constitutional right to procreate. Assuming
there is a constitutional right to procreate, this right cannot override
the surrogate's right to abort. Society's interest in maintaining
205. With the use of an artificial womb, the concerns of physical autonomy
expressed in Roe v. Wade are not present so that the rights of the fetus may take
precedence. Thus, the State may proscribe terminations of pregnancies, but not
'womb emptying.'That is, the couple would not be able to destroy the fetus. See
Goldstein, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State
Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REv.
877 (1978). Yet, unlike the surrogate motherhood arrangement, the State should be
responsible for the resulting child if the couple changed their minds. With physical

autonomy not present, the detrimental effects of child rearing recognized in Roe v.
Wade may be asserted. Moreover, if the fetus is found to be defective, the couple
may assert a right to eugenic abortion. See Rush, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion
and "Roe v. Wade": How Viable is "Roe's" Viability Standard?, 50

BROOKLYN

L.

R.V. 113 (1983). The couple's wishes, therefore, would be in accord with the State's
interest in preventing genetic defects.
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personal autonomy must take precedence over a couple's wish to
procreate.
Although there is an absolute prohibition against the regulation
of the surrogate's right of abortion, legislation may be passed to
provide the couple with alternatives to vetoing the surrogate's right.
These alternatives, however, may prove ineffective in securing the
couple's objective of obtaining a healthy child. That is, remedies,
although in accordance with societal values, may be inadequate from
the couple's viewpoint. The ultimate solution lies in the development
of artificial womb technology.

